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ZYGOTE ZEITGEIST: LEGAL COMPLEXITIES 
IN THE EXPANDING PRACTICE OF  
EMBRYO DONATION 
Noah Geldberg* 
          In recent decades, individuals and couples facing the 
issue of infertility have been able to achieve parenthood 
through advances in assisted reproductive technology 
(ART), such as embryo donation. This Article evaluates the 
current law governing embryo donation, considers the 
different approaches courts and legislatures have taken to 
regulate embryo donation, and advocates for an approach 
that best balances the policy arguments underlying those 
approaches. Ultimately, this Article argues that contract 
law, rather than laws surrounding adoption, should govern 
embryo donations. This Article further argues that state 
legislatures should clarify the effectiveness of contract law 
within the field of embryo donation by defining embryos as 
property for purposes of contract law and establishing 
requirements associated with clinical consent forms that 
ensure that ART patients make informed and binding 
decisions about embryo disposition prior to undergoing 
treatment. 
  
 
 ∗ J.D., May 2016, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, many individuals and couples with infertility 
issues have been able to achieve parenthood thanks to advances in 
assisted reproductive technology (ART).1 While the practice of 
gamete donation2 has existed for some time, donated embryos have, 
in recent years, become available as a result of the fact that many 
unused embryos are created as byproducts of other ART procedures.3 
Embryo donation is the transferring of legal rights to cryogenically-
stored, unused human embryos that remain following the 
administration of ART treatments.4 The original owners of the 
embryo (“progenitors”) consent to this transfer; the recipients 
thereby obtain legal ownership of the embryo.5 If the recipients are 
themselves ART patients, they will have the embryo implanted and 
gestated in hopes of producing a live child.6 Some donors and 
recipients prefer the term “embryo adoption.”7 
Embryo donation/adoption and other forms of frozen embryo 
disposition8 raise a host of legal and ethical issues that have not yet 
been resolved by courts and legislatures.9 This Article will focus on 
two of these issues: namely whether embryo donations should be 
regulated in exactly the same manner as gamete donations or in ways 
more akin to adoptions, and whether progenitors who have embryos 
in storage should be legally bound to dispositional choices they made 
before the embryos were even created. 
A hypothetical is helpful to illustrate how one or both of these 
issues might arise in the context of a typical couple’s ART 
experience. A couple with infertility issues decides to undergo ART 
treatment. During the couple’s first visit to the fertility clinic, they 
 
 1. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, The Technological Family: What’s New and What’s Not, 33 
FAM. L.Q. 691, 692–94 (1999) (discussing use of ART in the United States). 
 2. Gamete donation refers to the use of donated human sperm or egg cells in the conception 
of a child. See Michelle L. Anderson, Comment, Are You My Mommy? A Call for Regulation of 
Embryo Donation, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 589, 598–600 (2006). 
 3. Id. at 598–602. 
 4. See id. at 600–02. 
 5. Id. at 600. 
 6. See id. at 601. 
 7. Maggie Davis, Maryland “Embryo Adoption”: Religious Entanglement in the Maryland 
Stem Cell Research Act of 2006, 17 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 291, 318–20 (2014). 
 8. These other disposition options are typically: leaving the embryos frozen in storage, 
donating them for research, or having them destroyed. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 125315(b) (West 2014). 
 9. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 593–95. 
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are presented with a voluminous stack of paperwork to complete. 
Among many forms relating to everything from health risks to 
payment terms is a document that prompts the couple to select the 
manner in which they would like to dispose of any embryos 
remaining after their ART treatments have concluded. Without 
giving it much thought—since there is so much paperwork to fill out, 
and since the notion of having to dispose of excess embryos seems 
extremely distant in this earliest stage of the ART process—the 
couple decides that donating their excess embryos seems like the 
charitable thing to do. Accordingly, they select embryo donation on 
the disposition consent form. Years later, after the couple has had a 
child and long forgotten about the paperwork that made him 
possible, they receive a phone call from the fertility clinic. The clinic 
informs them that someone has expressed interest in acquiring one of 
their unused embryos. Should the couple now be able to revoke their 
consent and prevent the clinic from handing their embryo over to 
strangers? If the couple is still comfortable with allowing their excess 
embryos to go to someone else, should they have a right to control 
who gets the embryo or how much contact the couple will have with 
the ultimate recipient? What about the child that results from the 
embryo? Should that child have a right to learn the identities of his or 
her biological parents? 
This Article evaluates the existing statutory and decisional law 
governing embryo donation as it applies to both donors and 
recipients. Part II presents background information on the history of 
embryo donation. Part III explains different approaches to regulating 
embryo donation, discusses the legal implications of each approach, 
and proposes an ideal solution for regulating the practice. Part IV 
details the ways in which judicial decisions have construed clinical 
consent forms indicating embryo disposition options and discusses 
the policy arguments underlying these various determinations. Part 
IV also advocates for an approach that best balances these competing 
policy considerations. 
Ultimately, this Article will argue that contract principles rather 
than adoption-like principles should govern embryo donations and 
that state legislatures should clarify the effectiveness of contract law 
within the field of embryo donation by both (1) defining embryos as 
property for purposes of contract law, and (2) establishing 
requirements associated with clinical consent forms that ensure that 
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ART patients make informed and binding decisions about embryo 
disposition prior to undergoing treatment. 
II.  HISTORY OF EMBRYO DONATION 
Though some ART methods have been around for centuries, 
sophisticated techniques are a relatively recent phenomenon. The 
earliest form of ART was artificial insemination, a method which 
dates back as far as the eighteenth century.10 This procedure simply 
involves injecting the sperm of a man into the uterus of a woman by 
means other than coitus.11 Artificial insemination remained the only 
technological method of achieving conception for many decades.12 
By the late 1970s, however, scientists had made great strides in the 
field of ART.13 
The year 1978 marked the first live birth of a human child 
conceived by way of in vitro fertilization (IVF).14 IVF involves 
extracting egg cells from a female and combining them with sperm 
in a laboratory setting to produce human embryos.15 Doctors implant 
these embryos in the female’s uterus, where one or more of them 
ideally develops into a child. Since its inception, IVF has become a 
very effective means of facilitating conception.16 In fact, it has 
become so popular in the United States that more than 1 percent of 
babies born in America each year are products of IVF.17 Because of 
IVF treatments, however, many couples find themselves with unused 
embryos left in cryogenic storage.18 
Due to the expense, emotional hardship, and potential for 
medical complication involved in the process of harvesting oocytes 
and implanting embryos, it is standard practice for IVF practitioners 
to prepare multiple embryos for implantation.19 Un-implanted 
embryos are cryogenically stored for future attempts should the 
 
 10. Davis, supra note 7, at 309. 
 11. Artificial Insemination, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/american_english/artificial-insemination (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
 12. See Davis, supra note 7, at 309. 
 13. See id. at 310. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Paul C. Redman II & Lauren Fielder Redman, Seeking a Better Solution for the 
Disposition of Frozen Embryos: Is Embryo Adoption the Answer?, 35 TULSA L.J. 583, 584–85 
(2000). 
 16. Davis, supra note 7, at 310. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Redman & Redman, supra note 15, at 586. 
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initial embryos fail to result in a viable pregnancy.20 Typically, 
however, some embryos remain unused once IVF treatment has 
proven successful.21 Thus, couples who find themselves with surplus 
embryos in storage are generally presented with a number of options 
as to how to dispose of them. Couples may keep the embryos in 
storage, have them destroyed, donate them to scientific research, or 
donate them to others who are seeking to start families via ART.22 
Each of these options has unique legal and moral implications.23 
Embryo donation is the process by which those who possess 
unused embryos may transfer their legal rights to them to others who 
wish to become parents.24 Researchers achieved the first viable 
pregnancy resulting from an embryo transfer in 1983 and saw the 
first live birth of a child developed from a donated embryo in 1985.25 
Though doctors have been able to transfer embryos between fertility 
patients for years, the practice has attracted attention only recently as 
certain political groups have begun to argue that embryo transfers 
should be regulated similarly to traditional adoptions.26 
Traditional adoptions differ from embryo donation transactions 
in that they involve numerous legal formalities and procedures 
designed to evaluate the fitness of prospective parents and to protect 
the best interests of affected children. Embryo donations, conversely, 
are typically effectuated through private arrangements between 
consenting parties and are subject to much less scrutiny by 
government agencies.27 In recent years, however, certain adoption 
agencies, have begun to offer “embryo adoptions.” Embryo 
adoptions are embryo transfer transactions that are arranged similarly 
to traditional adoptions, and that accordingly include the various 
screening procedures characteristic of traditional adoptions.28 
Embryo adoptions differ from true adoptions in that the 
procedural requirements that define them are voluntarily 
 
 20. See id. 
 21. See Davis, supra note 7, at 310. 
 22. See Redman & Redman, supra note 15, at 586–87. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Anderson, supra note 2, at 600. 
 25. Jennifer Baker, Comment, A War of Words: How Fundamentalist Rhetoric Threatens 
Reproductive Autonomy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 671, 686–87 (2009). 
 26. See Aaron Zitner, A Cold War on Embryo Adoptions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002, http:// 
articles.latimes.com/2002/mar/22/news/mn-34140. 
 27. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 607. 
 28. Polina M. Dostalik, Note, Embryo “Adoption”? The Rhetoric, the Law, and the Legal 
Consequences, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 867, 873 (2011). 
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implemented by private agencies.29 Thus, in most cases, only 
prospective parents who actively wish to acquire embryos through an 
adoption-like procedure need subject themselves to screening 
procedures akin to those associated with traditional adoption. Many 
couples who choose such arrangements do so for religious reasons.30 
The term “embryo adoption” however is problematic because it 
mischaracterizes the legal significance of embryo transfer 
transactions. 
In 1997, John and Marlene Strege became the first couple to 
“adopt” an embryo.31 Marlene, who had been diagnosed with 
premature ovarian failure,32 did not wish to conceive a child by 
combining her husband’s sperm with a donor egg.33 As she put it, 
“[h]aving donor eggs fertilized by my husband would bring a third 
person into our marriage.”34 The Streges received ethical counseling 
about the notion of adopting an embryo from Dr. James Dobson.35 
They then worked with their long-time family friend, Ron Stoddart 
to arrange the donation of an embryo which was implanted in 
Marlene’s uterus.36 On December 31, 1998, Marlene gave birth to 
her daughter, Hannah, the world’s very first “Snowflake Baby.”37 
Stoddart, a trained adoption attorney, was director of Nightlight 
Christian Adoptions in Orange County, California at the time.38 In 
helping the Streges, he saw the potential to bring many more frozen 
 
 29. See Davis, supra note 7, at 319–20. 
 30. See id. at 320–21. 
 31. See Rick Monroe, Family Shares of Incredible Journey from Frozen Embryo to 
Snowflake Teen, LIVE ACTION NEWS (Aug. 11, 2012, 1:50 PM), http://liveactionnews.org/family-
shares-of-incredible-journey-from-frozen-embryo-to-snowflake-teen. 
 32. Rob Blackhurst, Would You Adopt an Embryo?, INDEPENDENT.IE (Oct. 28, 2013, 9:30 
PM), http://www.independent.ie/life/family/mothers-babies/would-you-adopt-an-embryo-29704 
187.html. 
 33. See Monroe, supra note 31. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Meet the First Snowflake! (Embryo Adoption), CHRISTIAN LIFE RESOURCES, http:// 
www.christianliferesources.com/article/meet-the-first-snowflake-embryo-adoption-1317 (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2015). Dr. James Dobson is a notable Christian activist who founded an 
organization known as Focus on the Family, which strives to provide families with resources to 
maintain healthy relationships. See Our Founder–Dr. James Dobson, FOCUS ON THE FAMILY, 
http://www.focusonthefamily.com/about_us/james-dobson.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2015). 
 36. See Monroe, supra note 31. 
 37. Id. “Snowflake Baby” is a term that Marlene Strege coined to refer to babies born as a 
result of embryo adoption. She chose this term because she felt that embryos are like snowflakes: 
each frozen, unique, and never again to be created. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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embryos to life.39 Nightlight has facilitated the births of hundreds of 
Snowflake Babies since Hannah.40 The agency distinguishes its 
“embryo adoption” program from the embryo donation services 
offered by fertility clinics, explaining that Nightlight takes care to 
execute embryo transfers in a manner analogous to traditional 
adoptions.41 Nightlight ensures that potential embryo recipients 
undergo home studies,42 and that families who choose to donate their 
embryos are able to select the parents with whom those embryos will 
ultimately be placed.43 
Many organizations have followed in Nightlight’s footsteps, 
offering “embryo adoptions” rather than simple transfers of embryo 
ownership from donor to recipient.44 Couples seeking an “embryo 
adoption” “must complete an application, traditional adoption home 
study, adoption education program, undergo health checks, and pay a 
fee.”45 In most states, none of these steps are legal requirements for 
obtaining ownership of an embryo.46 Thus, a couple that simply 
wants to obtain a donated embryo can do so from a fertility clinic 
without submitting to any comparable screening procedures. 
Donors too may choose whether to donate their embryos 
through agencies offering “embryo adoptions” or fertility clinics.47 If 
they decide on the latter option, a clinic may post anonymous 
information about the genetic characteristics of the donors’ embryo 
on its website for interested embryo seekers to peruse. If prospective 
parents who desire the embryo are deemed a match for it after basic 
 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Frequently Asked Adoption Questions–FAQs, NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, 
https://www.nightlight.org/faqs (last visited Oct. 28, 2014). 
 42. A “home study” is a two- to four-month process designed to instruct and evaluate a 
couple looking to become adoptive parents. Home studies consist of education, interviews, and 
paperwork intended to build parenting skills in those seeking to adopt, and to help both the 
prospective parents and the adoption agency determine the couple’s preparedness to become the 
parents of an adopted child. Id.; Home Study Services and Family Assessments, NIGHTLIGHT 
CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, https://www.nightlight.org/home-study-services/ (last visited Jan. 12, 
2015). 
 43. Frequently Asked Adoption Questions–FAQs, supra note 41. 
 44. See Embryo Adoption Agencies, EMBRYO ADOPTION AWARENESS CENTER, http:// 
www.embryoadoption.org/adoption_agencies/embryo_adoption_services_matrix.cfm (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2015). 
 45. Dostalik, supra note 28, at 874. 
 46. See id. 
 47. Sarah Elizabeth Richards, Get Used to Embryo Adoption, TIME (Aug. 24, 2013), 
http://ideas.time.com/2013/08/24/get-used-to-embryo-adoption. 
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physical and psychological testing, they will acquire the embryo 
anonymously.48 
An “adoption” approach gives donors much more control over 
the recipients of their embryos. It also enables donors to maintain 
contact with the adoptive family should they choose to do so, a 
feature which many donors seem to desire.49 Indeed, a representative 
for the National Embryo Donation Center recently reported that more 
than half of donors prefer at least some degree of openness in their 
donation transactions.50 Whichever approach participants choose, 
embryo donation is an attractive option for many couples hoping to 
become parents because it enables mothers to experience pregnancy, 
and it is relatively inexpensive as compared to other forms of ART.51 
Thus, embryo donation is likely to continue to grow in popularity.52 
III.  CONTRACT PRINCIPLES VERSUS ADOPTION PRINCIPLES: WHICH 
SHOULD CONTROL EMBRYO DONATION TRANSACTIONS? 
A.  Present State of the Law 
Currently, a lack of clear and consistent regulation has forced 
families to rely on private contracts to delineate rights they acquire in 
donated embryos.53 Further, little directly applicable precedent is 
available to guide courts in resolving disputes that arise from such 
contracts.54 These circumstances have led to tremendous uncertainty 
in the law.55 
The difficulty of regulating embryo donation begins with the 
uncertain legal status of embryos.56 This varies by jurisdiction and is 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Dostalik, supra note 28, at 874 (“The average cost of adopting an embryo, not including 
fertility clinic charges and medical fees for implantation, is approximately $4,500. It is less 
expensive than both IVF and traditional adoption, which can cost as much as $15,000 and 
$30,000, respectively.” (citations omitted)). 
 52. With the number of frozen embryos remaining in cryopreservation across the United 
States now exceeding 600,000 by some estimates, this problem is significant. Did You Know?, 
EMBRYO ADOPTION AWARENESS CENTER, http://www.embryoadoption.org/videos/vp_Did_You 
_Know.cfm (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). The current number of stored frozen embryos represents 
a 54 percent increase since 2002. Id. 
 53. See Dostalik, supra note 28, at 869. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Embryo Donation: Unresolved Legal 
Issues in the Transfer of Surplus Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 VILL. L. REV. 169, 176 (2004). 
 56. See Dostalik, supra note 28, at 875. 
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often unclearly defined.57 Three basic views exist as to the 
personhood of embryos.58 The first view is based on the notion that 
life begins at conception, a position that underlies political 
movements opposing abortion, stem cell research, and similar 
issues.59 Under this ideology, an embryo possesses the same legal 
status as a living human being.60 At the other end of the spectrum is 
the view that embryos are mere property, no different than any other 
possessions.61 Finally, there exists a moderate position that considers 
embryos to be a form of property deserving of “special respect” due 
to their potentiality for life.62 The legal status of embryos has a 
critical influence on the way in which embryo transfer transactions 
are regulated. If embryos are nothing but ordinary property then they 
are clearly subject to contract law; if they occupy the same legal 
status as human beings, however, then an argument exists that 
prospective parents must acquire them through adoption-like 
procedures.63 Finally, if embryos are property deserving of “special 
respect,” it is unclear what legal principles should apply to them.64 
Louisiana is the only state to have expressly embraced the 
embryo-as-person stance,65 having passed a statute that defines an 
embryo as “a juridical person . . . recognized as a separate entity 
apart from the medical facility or clinic where it is housed or 
stored.”66 Other states, however, have enacted statutes suggesting 
similar consideration of embryos.67 
Though no state statutes embody the embryo-as-property 
position, many courts have embraced it.68 The Oregon Court of 
Appeals, for example, has held that “the contractual right to possess 
or dispose of . . . frozen embryos is personal property that is subject 
 
 57. See Davis, supra note 7, at 318. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. at 317–18. 
 60. Id. at 318.  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Dostalik, supra note 28, at 878. 
 64. Angela K. Upchurch, A Postmodern Deconstruction of Frozen Embryo Disputes, 39 
CONN. L. REV. 2107, 2123 (2007). 
 65. Dostalik, supra note 28, at 876. 
 66. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:125 (1986). 
 67. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (2010) (“The life of each human being begins at 
conception; [u]nborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being . . . .”). 
 68. Dostalik, supra note 28, at 877. 
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to a ‘just and proper’ division.”69 Other courts have applied contract 
law to the disposition of embryos, and thus implicitly held 
similarly.70 
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Davis71 
exemplifies the intermediate position that embryos are to be 
accorded a legal status somewhere between people and property.72 
Davis involved a divorce dispute in which a wife sought custody of 
embryos that she and her husband had had prepared during their 
marriage.73 The wife wished to retain custody of the embryos so that 
she could use them to become pregnant after the divorce, while the 
husband wanted the embryos to remain frozen.74 The trial court 
decided that embryos were human beings from the moment of 
fertilization, and it accordingly granted custody of the embryos to 
Mrs. Davis.75 The appellate court reversed this decision, however, 
and the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the reversal.76 As that 
Court explained, “[w]e conclude that pre-embryos are not, strictly 
speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim 
category that entitles them to special respect because of their 
potential for human life.”77 
B.  Issues Raised by the Competing Approaches 
Each of the three approaches that states have taken in defining 
the personhood of embryos carries with it distinct legal advantages 
and disadvantages. Because the legal status of embryos dictates the 
principles that will control transfers of embryo ownership, this 
section will explain the relative merits of the approaches. 
1.  The Embryo as a Person 
Early American common law did not accord any degree of 
personhood to embryos.78 Before the late nineteenth century, 
 
 69. In re Marriage of Dahl & Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 839 (Or. 2008). 
 70. See Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 506–10 (discussing application of contract 
law to the disposition of frozen embryos, and recognizing that “the contractual approach has been 
applied/endorsed in five states”). 
 71. 842 S.W.2d 588 (1992). 
 72. See Dostalik, supra note 28, at 876–77. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 876. 
 75. Id. at 876–77. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). 
 78. See Davis, supra note 7, at 295. 
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abortion was legal in the United States prior to the “quickening”79 
stage of pregnancy.80 Notably, later movements toward the 
criminalization of abortion in America were fueled not by reverence 
for the personhood of unborn children, but rather largely by growing 
societal disdain for “indecent” behavior.81 Late nineteenth century 
Americans opposed abortion not because they felt that fetuses were 
human beings whose rights needed to be protected, but rather 
because prohibiting abortion would curb promiscuous behavior and 
promote the societal goal of female chastity before marriage.82 The 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of the personhood of unborn 
children in the landmark case of Roe v. Wade.83 The Roe Court 
stated: “the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons 
in the whole sense.”84 
The Roman Catholic Church views things differently, however, 
as that institution has expressed its belief that embryos are fully 
human.85 Italy has embraced the Vatican’s position, and accordingly 
that nation’s IVF regulations permit the harvesting of no more than 
three eggs per IVF cycle, all of which must be implanted in the 
patient undergoing treatment.86 
Louisiana’s large Catholic population appears to have 
influenced the state’s active classification of the embryo as a 
“juridical person.”87 While Louisiana’s reverence for human life is 
admirable, its position on the personhood of embryos is untenable in 
contemporary America. 
First, the “embryo-as-person” position makes little sense in light 
of Roe v. Wade.88 That case gave women the right to abort nonviable 
fetuses.89 Thus, if embryos are to be considered people, a woman 
would be forbidden to destroy one while it remained cryogenically 
 
 79. Quickening is the time at which a pregnant woman first becomes aware of fetal 
movement. This usually occurs between the twelfth and sixteenth weeks of gestation. Id. 
 80. Id. at 295–96. 
 81. Id. at 296–99. 
 82. Id. at 297. 
 83. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 84. Id. at 162. 
 85. Shirley Darby Howell, The Frozen Embryo: Scholarly Theories, Case Law, and 
Proposed State Regulation, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 407, 411 (2013). 
 86. Id. at 411–12. Notably, New Mexico has taken a similar approach to regulating IVF, 
mandating that all in vitro fertilized eggs be implanted in human female recipients. Id. at 412. 
 87. See id. at 412. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
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preserved, but she would be permitted to abort it once it had been 
implanted in her uterus.90 Second, classifying an embryo as a person 
implies that destroying it is tantamount to murder.91 This would very 
likely inhibit use of IVF in the United States, as IVF providers would 
surely fear both civil and criminal consequences of harming 
embryos.92 
Categorizing embryos as persons could cause further difficulties 
in the context of embryo disposition disputes, as the “person” 
designation would force courts to decide such disputes under a “best 
interests of the child” analysis.93 Not only would such an approach 
undermine parties’ reliance interests in any disposition agreement 
they may have entered prior to undergoing IVF,94 but also, the 
efficacy of a “best interests of the child” test being applied to a child 
who has not yet been born is highly questionable.95 
Thus, it seems that classifying embryos as human beings will 
likely prove extremely problematic. Accordingly, the policy that this 
approach embodies, namely affording the greatest possible protection 
to potential human lives, is easily outweighed by practical 
considerations in this context, and states that have not yet codified 
the legal status of embryos should avoid this flawed approach. 
Indeed, though the Louisiana and New Mexico statutes have not yet 
been challenged in court, they have been described as 
“constitutionally weak and unenforceable as a practical matter.”96 
2.  The Embryo as Property 
A position that views embryos as mere property subject to the 
same rules as all other chattels may also bring about undesirable 
ramifications. Ordinary property may be sold, traded, or destroyed by 
its owner at his or her will.97 To suggest that progenitors of embryos 
have complete freedom to dispose of them in any of these ways is 
disquieting. To begin with, most ethicists and professional 
organizations discourage direct payment for embryos, and some 
 
 90. See Howell, supra note 85, at 412. 
 91. Davis, supra note 7, at 316. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Upchurch, supra note 64, at 2121. 
 94. See Howell, supra note 85, at 416–17. 
 95. Upchurch, supra note 64, at 2121. 
 96. Howell, supra note 85, at 413. 
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states prohibit such compensation by statute.98 This strong 
opposition to the sale of embryos demonstrates that many view them 
to be inherently distinct from other items of personal property. This 
is logical considering the biological potential of embryos, and the 
rigid formalism that characterizes property law. 
If embryos have the same legal status as ordinary objects, then 
ownership disputes would focus solely on the relative rights of 
claimants.99 Thus, the interests of a potential child that might result 
from an embryo would be entirely absent from such a contest, which 
would boil down to a routine title determination.100 This framework 
would lead to further complications related to other aspects of 
property law. For example, it would be possible for legal and 
equitable title to an embryo to become vested in different parties, and 
it would also be possible for an embryo to become part of a 
decedent’s estate, and thus transferable by will or intestate 
succession.101 The notion that the rigid rules of property law could 
create a situation wherein an individual’s embryos end up in the 
possession of someone who was never designated to acquire them, 
and who was not chosen based on consideration of the best interests 
of children that could result from the embryos is highly 
discomforting. 
Thus, subjecting embryos to all aspects of property law is bound 
to produce numerous ethically questionable results. This approach is 
also less than ideal, but is perhaps preferable to the “embryo-as-
person” position, whose troubling implications seem decidedly more 
immediate and severe in that they both create a legal paradox and 
potentially subject IVF practitioners to the risk of criminal liability 
for negligent conduct.102 
3.  The Embryo as an Interim Category  
Deserving of “Special Respect” 
Squarely defining embryos as either people or property creates 
significant problems when the full scope of rules applicable to either 
 
 98. Executive Summary of Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Analysis and 
Recommendations for Public Policy, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://www.health.ny.gov/ 
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Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193, 206 (1997). 
 100. See id. 
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category is considered. Thus, the intermediate approach to defining 
the legal status of embryos would seem most sensible. This approach 
too, however, is not without its imperfections. 
In deciding to implement the intermediate approach in Davis v. 
Davis,103 the Tennessee Supreme Court relied largely on the ethical 
standards set forth by the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility 
Society.104 The Davis court cited a report by the Ethics Committee 
that justified the intermediate view of an embryo’s legal status on 
grounds that an embryo “has not yet developed the features of 
personhood, is not yet established as developmentally individual, and 
may never realize its biologic potential.”105 
The Davis court ultimately stated that embryos “occupy an 
interim category [between persons and property] that entitles them to 
special respect because of their potential for human life.”106 Most 
courts and commentators have embraced this view, but its exact 
meaning remains somewhat unclear.107 In practice, the “special 
respect” status gives embryo progenitors the authority to create 
contracts concerning the use or disposition of their embryos, and 
implies that disputes arising from such contracts will be adjudicated 
in light of the progenitors’ constitutional interests in procreation.108 
Stating that embryos are deserving of “special respect” seems to 
imply that courts would favor preservation or implantation of 
embryos over their destruction or continued storage, but in fact, the 
opposite appears to be true.109 
In favoring an individual’s right not to procreate, American 
courts have relied on two basic grounds. The first is that “the law 
shall not be used as a mechanism for forcing [family] relationships 
when they are not desired . . . [because] respect for liberty and 
privacy requires that individuals be accorded the freedom to decide 
 
 103. 842 SW.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
 104. Id. at 596. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society is now known as the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine Ethics Committee. Alyssa Lechmanik, Student 
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 105. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596. 
 106. Id. at 597. 
 107. See Howell, supra note 85, at 414. 
 108. Upchurch, supra note 64, at 2123. 
 109. Howell, supra note 85, at 415; see also, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (“Ordinarily, the 
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whether to enter into a family relationship.”110 The second is that 
favoring the rights of an individual who seeks to avoid parenthood 
allows parties who are in conflict about their respective rights to 
frozen embryos to maintain the status quo by keeping those embryos 
frozen until they can come to a mutual decision as to how to dispose 
of them.111 
A significant problem with the “property deserving of special 
respect” status as it is currently applied is that it leaves open the 
possibility that a court may look to any number of different legal 
standards to resolve a dispute involving embryos.112 In practice, 
courts tend to apply principles of property law in adjudicating 
embryo disputes because analyzing such disputes within a property-
like framework enables courts to better manage them within the 
adversarial legal system.113 The difference between embryos 
occupying the legal status of ordinary property and them being 
designated as “property deserving of special respect,” however, is 
that courts are not required to adhere to all property principles in 
such cases.114 This is problematic because it introduces a degree of 
unpredictability into embryo disputes. 
C.  Proposing a Solution 
The fact that any embryo donation transaction involves the 
transfer of genetic material that has the full potential to develop into 
a child has prompted many to analogize the practice to traditional 
adoption. While such a comparison may appear logical at first 
glance, the parallels between embryo donation and traditional 
adoption begin to break down upon examination of the essential 
mechanics of adoption law. 
Arguments in favor of regulating embryo transfer transactions 
under adoption law find their basis in the view that life begins at 
conception.115 This position is popular in the religious, pro-life 
community, and is justified in part by the belief that each embryo has 
 
 110. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000); but see CA 2401/95 Nahmani v. 
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a unique composition.116 Proponents of embryo adoption argue that 
treating the embryo transfer process like a traditional adoption 
affords receiving parents beneficial guidance and counseling, and 
that it also ensures that donating parents are given more control over 
the placement of their embryos, which will ultimately grow into 
children who share their genetic material.117 While these features 
may be desirable in the embryo donation context, it is clear that most 
courts and legislatures remain unconvinced that adoption law should 
apply to embryos.118 
While the acquisition of a frozen embryo may seem to resemble 
an adoption in certain respects, numerous aspects of adoption law are 
inappropriate in this context.119 Part of the difficulty involved in 
attempting to apply adoption principles to embryo donation arises 
from the fact that a child resulting from this procedure necessarily 
has at least three biological parents, namely the two individuals 
whose genetic material comprises the donated embryo, and the 
mother who ultimately gives birth to the child that develops from the 
embryo.120 Adoption law generally assumes that a child has only one 
set of biological parents, and its purpose is to sever a child’s ties to 
these individuals and to create a new familial relationship between 
the child and another, distinct set of parents.121 In an embryo 
donation scenario, the birth mother is typically the intended mother 
of the resulting child, and her parentage must thus be maintained.122 
Other features of adoption law further demonstrate that it is not 
suitable for application to transactions involving embryos. Most 
states make it illegal for a mother to consent to adoption before her 
child is born, and all states recognize a period after the child is born 
during which the birth mother can rescind her consent to adoption.123 
These basic tenets of adoption law clearly cannot be applied in the 
context of embryo transfers. 
 
 116. See id. 
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http://www.embryoadoption.org/faqs/adopting.cfm (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (“In the United 
States embryos are considered property, not people and therefore the ‘owners’ [the donors] of the 
embryos transfer the ownership to the recipient family via contract law.”). 
 119. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 615. 
 120. See id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Dostalik, supra note 28, at 885–86. 
 
830 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:813 
Finally, because fewer than one third of embryo transfers 
ultimately result in the birth of children, if such transactions were 
governed by adoption law, most would involve extensive pre-
placement procedures that would ultimately prove unnecessary due 
to the failure of an embryo donation to result in a live birth.124 
For all these reasons, contract law is much more suitable for the 
regulation of embryo donations. Moreover, even if contract law 
controls, the main advantages of adoption law, namely the security 
and control associated with its extensive screening procedures, are 
available to donors and recipients who choose to conduct their 
embryo transfers through agencies that voluntarily implement 
adoption-like procedures. Current problems with contract law stem 
from the uncertain legal status of embryos. The fact that some states 
have either failed to define the personhood of embryos, or have 
defined it unclearly makes the enforceability of privately drafted 
embryo transfer contracts uncertain. 
It is thus of paramount importance that the enforceability of 
embryo donation agreements be made predictable. State legislatures 
could ensure such predictability, while still allowing courts the 
flexibility to avoid having to make rulings that contravene the policy 
of giving special deference to the potential for life that embryos 
embody, by according a contextually variable legal status upon 
embryos. Legislatures could accomplish this by passing statutes that 
expressly delineate the manner in which embryos are to be 
considered in different categories of legal disputes. 
Tennessee, for example, has embraced the “property deserving 
of special respect” view of embryo personhood.125 Additionally, 
however, the Tennessee Legislature has passed a statute that 
expressly subjects transfers of embryo ownership to contract law.126 
Section 36-2-403 of the Tennessee Code explicitly states that embryo 
transfers may be effected via contract, and thus enables parties to an 
embryo transfer to arrange the transaction with certainty that contract 
principles will control it.127 By taking the simple act of explicitly 
codifying Tennessee’s position on the applicability of contract law in 
the embryo donation context, the state’s legislature has greatly 
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facilitated embryo transactions within its borders by signaling to the 
practitioners involved which legal principles will govern. Moreover, 
the state remains free to recognize the “special respect” due to 
embryos by passing additional statutes that treat embryos differently 
in other contexts. The legislature could, for example, declare that the 
best interests of a child that might result from an embryo are to 
determine its ownership in the event that the embryo must pass by 
intestate succession. 
By passing statutes that dictate the ways in which embryos are 
to be treated under different bodies of law, state legislatures can 
embrace an intermediate position on embryo personhood without 
doing so in a manner that makes the law governing transfers of 
embryo ownership unclear. Such an approach would greatly improve 
the legal landscape surrounding embryo donation. 
IV.  THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO ENFORCE CLINICAL  
CONSENT FORMS AS CONTRACTS 
Many fertility clinics require patients preparing to undergo IVF 
to sign consent forms by which those individuals indicate an option 
for the disposition of excess embryos.128 Such options typically 
include donation for research, donation for use by another fertility 
patient, continued storage, or destruction. A few states have even 
passed statutes requiring clinics to provide such forms.129 Though 
these forms are intended to prevent disputes over embryo disposition, 
their legal effect is often unclear.130 The manner in which a court 
will ultimately interpret them thus depends largely on the legal status 
of embryos within the state where that court sits. 
California is among the states requiring fertility clinics to 
provide embryo disposition consent forms to patients.131 Section 
125315 of the California Health and Safety Code is typical of state 
statutes governing the provision of embryo disposition consent forms 
in terms of the options it describes, as well as the fact that it is silent 
regarding the enforceability of the forms.132 Section 125315 requires 
that doctors administering fertility treatments provide their patients 
 
 128. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic Consent Forms Are 
Not the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 57, 58–59 (2011). 
 129. Id. at 59. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315 (West 2014). 
 132. See Forman, supra note 128, at 90. 
 
832 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:813 
with “timely, relevant, and appropriate information to allow the 
individual to make an informed and voluntary choice regarding the 
disposition of any human embryos remaining following the fertility 
treatment.”133 The statute goes on to provide dispositional options to 
follow a number of potential circumstances, including death of either 
or both partners in a couple, separation of partners, or abandonment 
of embryos.134 
A.  Current Approaches 
State courts have reached opposing decisions on the issue of 
whether to enforce clinic consent forms as contracts.135 In Kass v. 
Kass,136 the New York Court of Appeals became the first to consider 
a marital dissolution case involving the disposition of embryos in 
which the parties had signed an agreement with their IVF provider 
concerning embryo storage.137 Reasoning that embryos were not to 
be considered “persons,” and that parties should be encouraged to 
think through contingencies relating to embryo disposition and to 
express their wishes carefully in writing prior to undergoing IVF 
treatment, the Kass court held that disposition agreements between 
embryo progenitors should generally be presumed valid and 
binding.138 Many other courts have followed this approach, and one 
has even gone so far as to enforce a cryopreservation agreement 
provision mandating the destruction of embryos despite both 
progenitors’ wishes to the contrary during their divorce 
proceedings.139 
In Litowitz, the Washington Supreme Court decided an embryo 
custody dispute between a divorcing husband and wife. The couple 
had two embryos stored in cryopreservation that had been created 
from the husband’s sperm and donor eggs.140 At the time of the 
litigation, the wife desired to have the embryos implanted in a 
surrogate, while the husband wanted to make them available for 
donation.141 Prior to having their embryos cryopreserved, however, 
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the couple had signed a disposition agreement with the storage 
facility in which they indicated that they wanted their embryos 
destroyed if the embryos remained in storage five years after the 
initial date of cryopreservation and the couple did not request that the 
facility extend the storage period.142 
In coming to its decision, the Litowitz court cited decisions from 
several other jurisdictions, including Davis and Kass. Quoting Davis, 
the court stated that 
disputes involving the disposition of pre-embryos produced 
by in vitro fertilization should be resolved, first, by looking 
to the preferences of the progenitors. If their wishes cannot 
be ascertained, or if there is dispute, then their prior 
agreement concerning disposition should be carried out. If 
no prior agreement exists, then the relative interests of the 
parties in using or not using the pre-embryos must be 
weighed.143 
Since the Litowitzes did not agree on the manner in which their 
embryos should be disposed of, the court turned to their 
cryopreservation agreement. It then embraced the reasoning of the 
Kass court: “[a]dvance directives, subject to mutual change of mind 
that must be jointly expressed, both minimize misunderstandings and 
maximize procreative liberty by reserving to the progenitors the 
authority to make what is in the first instance a quintessentially 
personal, private decision.”144 
Some courts, however, have taken a “contemporaneous consent” 
approach to enforcement of embryo disposition consent forms. While 
these courts also presume such forms to be binding, they will not 
enforce the disposition provisions in them in disputes between the 
embryo progenitors where one has changed his or her mind.145 This 
approach makes disposition agreements likely to be enforced in 
disputes between couples and IVF clinics rather than between the 
embryo progenitors themselves.146 
The Iowa Supreme Court took the contemporaneous consent 
approach in In re Marriage of Witten.147 That case concerned a 
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couple who had signed a cryopreservation agreement form that 
required both parties to consent to any use or disposition of the 
embryos they had in storage. When the couple entered divorce 
proceedings, the wife sought to have the embryos implanted in her or 
a surrogate so that she could have a child, while the husband opposed 
use of the embryos in this manner. The trial court gave effect to the 
couple’s agreement, and thus enjoined both parties from using the 
embryos.148 The wife challenged the trial court’s ruling on grounds 
that enforcement of the agreement would violate public policy by 
allowing the husband to back out of his implicit agreement to have 
children with her.149 The court rejected the wife’s public policy 
argument and proceeded to address the question of whether an 
embryo disposition agreement should be enforced after one party has 
become uncomfortable with his or her prior decisions as expressed in 
that agreement.150 
Reasoning that “judicial decisions and statutes in Iowa reflect 
respect for the right of individuals to make family and reproductive 
decisions based on their current views and values . . . [and] reveal 
awareness that such decisions are highly emotional in nature and 
subject to a later change of heart,” the court held that embryo 
disposition agreements signed at the time of in vitro fertilization are 
binding on the parties subject to the right of either party to change 
his or her mind up to the point of use or destruction of any stored 
embryo.151 The court went on to state that if parties to a dispute 
cannot reach a consensus as to what to do with their stored embryos, 
those embryos will remain in storage indefinitely with the party or 
parties opposing destruction held responsible for paying the storage 
fees.152 
B.  Policy Considerations 
Courts that have held IVF consent forms to be enforceable as 
contracts have done so with the intent of incentivizing embryo 
progenitors to consider carefully the possible consequences of 
preserving embryos in cryogenic storage prior to ordering the 
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embryos to be created.153 Another important justification for 
enforcing such forms as contracts is the reliance interests of the IVF 
patients who sign them.154 If the members of a couple intelligently 
agree to dispose of their embryos in a specified manner prior to 
undergoing IVF treatment, each member’s assent to that 
dispositional option may be fundamentally intertwined with his or 
her agreement to the IVF treatment.155 
For example, a husband who is uncomfortable with having 
genetic children outside of his marriage may agree to undergo IVF 
only because he signed a consent form that assured him that embryos 
remaining in storage after his death or in the event of a divorce 
would be destroyed. If a court were later to determine that the 
consent form did not constitute a binding contract, the husband’s 
expectations would be violated.156 Essentially, a court’s refusal to 
uphold the provisions of the consent form could lead to the continued 
preservation of embryos that would never have existed had the 
husband not believed that the form’s provisions would be 
enforced.157 
Though decisions regarding embryo disposition can often be a 
sensitive issue, and progenitors may change their minds for a variety 
of reasons, scholars have argued that enforcing disposition 
agreements signed prior to the administration of IVF treatment is the 
best way to give infertile couples control over what becomes of their 
embryos.158 Enforcing such agreements enables the embryo 
progenitors to direct their futures as parents, while invalidating them 
enables the courts, strangers to the progenitors, to do so.159 
While giving effect to embryo progenitors’ intent with respect to 
embryo disposition options is a desirable policy goal, some have 
argued that enforcing agreements entered into via consent forms 
signed prior to the administration of IVF is an ineffective way of 
achieving this goal.160 
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One major problem with IVF consent forms is procedural. 
Provisions governing embryo disposition often constitute one small 
part of a voluminous document that fertility clinics give to patients at 
the beginning of the IVF process.161 Such a document typically 
covers various aspects of cryopreservation including risks and 
benefits of the procedure, storage limitations, and payment terms.162 
This type of consent packet may obscure the significance of embryo 
disposition provisions by failing clearly to distinguish them from 
other topics, and by presenting them in technically worded language 
and a densely printed format.163 
Even when disposition agreements are presented separately from 
other forms associated with initiating the IVF process, significant 
problems still exist. A couple undergoing IVF may be required to 
sign many consent forms in a single day, and the overwhelming 
volume of information presented by all these documents may hinder 
the couple’s ability to consider each one thoughtfully.164 This 
phenomenon is particularly problematic in the context of initiating a 
fertility treatment, as patients typically experience heightened 
emotions while they concentrate on having a child, and may be 
unable to consider seriously all manner of worst-case scenarios as 
they focus on becoming parents.165 While it is true that many 
transactions in today’s world entail the execution of numerous forms 
whose combined content may be difficult for a signer to grasp fully, 
IVF consent forms present unique dangers, as they prompt couples to 
consider numerous complicated hypothetical scenarios that would 
arise from traumatic changes to a couple’s relationship.166 The 
variety and complexity of such scenarios, as well as the remoteness 
of these scenarios at the time of signing can make it very difficult for 
IVF patients to consider their consent paperwork with the degree of 
intelligence that it demands. 
Aside from the procedural defects associated with fertility clinic 
consent forms, embryo disposition agreements entered into prior to 
administration of IVF suffer from extreme substantive 
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deficiencies.167 To begin with, numerous studies have shown that 
fertility patients find embryo disposition decisions to be exceedingly 
difficult on moral and emotional levels.168 Further, research has 
demonstrated that patients’ views toward embryo disposition often 
change significantly over time.169 
The instability of fertility patients’ attitudes toward disposition 
is attributable to numerous factors. First, these attitudes are strongly 
influenced by patients’ experiences with IVF.170 Prior to initial 
treatment, patients may not seriously consider dispositional options 
because they do not know how many IVF cycles it will take to 
achieve pregnancy, and they are thus unable fully to grasp the 
implications of keeping excess embryos in storage.171 Because 
patients who have not yet undergone IVF do not fully appreciate the 
consequences of their dispositional decisions, they tend to feel a 
relatively high level of confidence in these decisions.172 
Studies indicate that things change significantly once IVF 
treatment has been administered.173 At this stage, couples more 
frequently feel conflicted over their dispositional decisions, and 
partners more frequently experience conflict with each other.174 The 
birth of a child as a result of IVF treatment often has particularly 
significant effects on fertility patients’ attitudes toward embryo 
disposition.175 For example, while patients often wish to donate their 
embryos to research or to other childless couples prior to and during 
treatment, once patients have succeeded in having children, they are 
more inclined to prefer that their embryos be discarded.176 
The extreme difficulty that couples face in arriving at decisions 
related to embryo disposition and the susceptibility of these decisions 
to change exacerbate the significant procedural deficiencies 
associated with IVF consent forms. Thus, enforcing consent forms as 
contracts appears to be a less than ideal method of effectuating the 
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parties’ true intentions with regard to the fate of their frozen 
embryos. 
C.  Striking a Balance 
An effective way in which to approach the enforcement of 
consent forms may be to address the issue of how informed the 
progenitors were at the time at which they signed. In J.B. v. M.B.,177 
the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to enforce an embryo 
disposition agreement entered by way of an IVF clinic consent 
form.178 Despite this, though, the court stated that it would enforce 
embryo disposition agreements entered at the time of IVF treatment 
if such agreements were written in plain language, adequately 
explained to the parties prior to execution, and made subject to the 
right of either party to change his or her mind prior to the use or 
destruction of embryos.179 
In February 2008, the American Bar Association introduced its 
Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology (“Model 
ART Act”) that embodies an approach similar to that endorsed by the 
J.B. court.180 Article 5 of the Model ART Act states that “[b]inding 
agreements executed prior to embryo creation must be entered into a 
record by intended parents as to . . . [i]ntended use and disposition of 
embryos.”181 The Model ART Act also provides that “[s]uch 
agreements may be amended at any time prior to transfer of an 
embryo or the death of either intended parent.”182 Further, the Model 
Act takes measures to ensure that IVF patients intelligently consent 
to the conditions of their disposition agreements.183 
The ART Model Act’s informed-consent provisions mandate 
that prior to treatment, ART providers advise patients regarding the 
need for them to enter binding agreements regarding embryo 
disposition.184 The Act functions to make this need intelligible to 
patients by stipulating that it must be communicated to them both 
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orally and in plain-language writing.185 By insisting that patients 
receive clear notice regarding the legal effect of the disposition 
agreements they must sign, the Act reduces the problem of defective 
consent that is often present in the context of IVF clinical consent 
forms. 
The ABA has also created a proposed model act to govern the 
licensing of ART agencies.186 This document may implement further 
measures to ensure that ART patients sign clinical consent forms 
intelligently. Though the ABA’s Family Law Section has not yet 
approved this new act, the current draft addresses some deficiencies 
in the Model ART Act. Section 304 of the new act, for example, 
enumerates a number of counseling requirements that an agency 
must comport with prior to administering ART treatment to a 
patient.187 Under section 304, ART agencies must advise their 
patients to “seek advice from medical, psychological, legal, and any 
other relevant third party professionals to discuss the potential risks 
and outcomes of the process.”188 Agencies must also give each 
patient an opportunity to consult with an attorney before 
treatment.189 
The ABA has also stated that it intends to supplement its Model 
ART Act “with a statement of necessary provisions and standards of 
best practice for drafting the informed consents and various ART 
agreements suggested or required by this Act and, to the extent 
possible, develop model forms.”190 
Should the ABA fully approve the new act and follow through 
with its intentions to supplement its model statutes, the result will 
likely be extremely beneficial to the practice of embryo donation. 
ABA approved embryo donation consent forms would help to set 
standards for legally effective language, while newly-imposed ART 
agency counseling requirements would ensure that IVF patients 
execute their consent forms thoughtfully, and would thus cause these 
 
 185. Id. §§ 201(2), 202(1)(a). 
 186. ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. AGENCIES (Proposed Draft 
2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/aba-model-act-agency-regulations-2.pdf. 
 187. Id. § 304. 
 188. Id. § 304(1)(f). 
 189. Id. § 304(1)(b). 
 190. ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., supra note 181, Prefatory 
Note. 
 
840 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:813 
forms to be more reflective of progenitors’ actual intent with respect 
to embryo disposition questions. 
If state legislatures passed statutes based on the ABA’s Model 
ART Act, many of the problems created by current consent forms 
could be reduced. States that have already enacted statutes requiring 
parties to execute some kind of consent form prior to commencing 
IVF treatment could amend these laws to impose additional 
requirements on disposition agreements that would make them better 
reflect the intentions of the parties that enter them. 
A statute could, for example, require that fertility clinics not 
only compel patients to sign plain-language disposition agreements 
prior to commencing IVF treatments, but that these clinics also 
provide legal counsel to the patients, who must make sure that the 
patients fully understand every provision of these agreements prior to 
signing. Statutes could further state that if clinics comply with their 
provisions, the disposition agreement consent forms signed by IVF 
patients become presumptively enforceable as contracts. It seems 
logical for states that already require IVF patients to sign consent 
forms to incorporate such language, as its continued omission 
appears to contravene the policy goals of these statutes. 
Legislatures could then mandate that only state—or ABA—
approved disposition agreements create a presumption of contractual 
enforceability when presented to patients in the manner proscribed 
by statute. The combined effect of state-approved agreements and 
legislatively-mandated counseling would go a long way toward 
making embryo disposition consent forms more effective tools for 
expressing parties’ intent and preventing protracted litigation in 
embryo disputes. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The practice of embryo donation is sufficiently widespread that 
state legislatures and high courts have begun to address its legal 
implications. Despite their efforts to date, however, embryo transfers 
are still fraught with a great deal of uncertainty for all parties 
involved. This uncertainty could be greatly reduced if states would 
explicitly embrace contract principles as the controlling standards to 
govern embryo donations. 
While the notion of “embryo adoption” seems to be gaining 
popularity, traditional adoption law remains ill-suited for application 
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to transactions involving embryos. Because the primary concern of 
adoption law is the welfare of a living child, many of its basic tenets 
do not make sense in the context of embryo donation. Accordingly, 
embryo donation is more properly regulated according to contract 
principles, and state legislatures should take measures to ensure that 
contract law will function to regulate embryo donations as 
predictably as possible. 
Even if contract law is fully applicable to embryo transactions, 
however, the issue of whether clinical consent forms signed prior to 
IVF treatment should be enforced as binding contracts still remains. 
In answering this question, important factors to be considered 
include the reliance interests of the parties involved, as well as the 
degree to which those parties are informed of the potential 
consequences of their consent at the time of signing. The ABA’s 
Model ART Act presents an ideally balanced approach. 
Embryo donation is a promising method of countering 
infertility, but the present dearth of settled law governing the practice 
leads all too often to bitter disputes between embryo progenitors. 
Basic remedies for some of the core problems that complicate this 
practice have begun to emerge, however, and if more jurisdictions 
actively implement them, the difficulties peculiar to embryo donation 
can be reduced, and this form of ART can begin to achieve its full 
potential. 
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